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Both motivational internalism and externalism need to explain why 
sometimes moral judgments tend to motivate us. In this paper, I argue 
that Dreier’ second-order desire model cannot be a plausible 
externalist alternative to explain the connection between moral 
judgments and motivation. I explain that the relevant second-order 
desire is merely a constitutive requirement of rationality because that 
desire makes a set of desires more unified and coherent. As a rational 
agent with the relevant second-order desire is disposed towards 
coherence, she will have some motivation to act in accordance with 
her moral judgments. Dreier’s second-order desire model thus 
collapses into a form of internalism and cannot be a plausible 
externalist option to explain the connection between moral judgments 
and motivation. 
 






1. Smith’s Internalist Challenge 
 
 In metaethics, motivational internalism is roughly the view according to 
which there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and 
motivation (Blackburn 1998; Gibbard 1990, 2003; Smith 1994, 1996a, 
1996b, 1997). Externalism, in contrast, maintains that this connection is at 
best a contingent one (Brink 1989, 45-49, 1997; Copp 1995, 1997; 
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Lillehammer 1997; Shafer-Landau 2003, 145-147; Sayre-McCord 1997; 
Svavarsdóttir 1999; Zangwill 2003, 2008). Yet, even if externalism were 
true, its defenders would still need to explain why at least our moral 
judgments usually tend to motivate us.  
 
Michael Smith, in his ground-breaking work on this topic, criticizes 
externalism with the famous fetishism argument. The fetishism argument 
begins from an ordinary observation that is normally accepted by both 
internalists and externalists. Suppose that I am engaged in a discussion 
with a fundraiser for a local charity that aims to improve the situation of 
homeless people. Let us further imagine that, initially, I have no intention 
to donate any money to the charity because I think that some homeless 
people should seek employment instead of relying on charities’ help. 
During the conversion, however, the fundraiser tries to persuade me that 
the majority of homeless people cannot work for different personal 
reasons. And, even if some of them could really work, they cannot always 
successfully secure jobs sufficiently quickly. The fundraiser further 
explains that her charity raises money not only to provide basic necessities 
for homeless people, but also to run political campaigns that hopefully can 
resolve the issues faced by the homeless. Now, if I am convinced by the 
fundraiser, I will begin to believe that it is morally right for me to give at 
least some money to the charity. Usually, we can also expect that I will 
thereby come to have some motivation to actually do so.  
 
The previous case illustrates how, when you change your moral judgment 
about whether you should give some money to a local charity, your 
corresponding motivation to make the donation also tends to change 
accordingly. This phenomenon is so common that we can conclude that ‘a 
change in motivation follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral 
judgment’ (Smith 1994, 71). Both internalists and externalists then face the 
burden of having to explain why this is the case.  
 
As internalists generally believe that there exists a necessary connection 
between moral judgments and motivation, it will be easier for them to 
explain the previous phenomenon. Internalists have already introduced 
different forms of internalism that can explain the reliable connection 
between moral judgments and motivation. For example, Smith puts 
forward a form of conditional internalism which suggests that practical 
rationality is a condition that must be satisfied in order for there to be a 
reliable connection between moral judgments and motivation. Here, we 
can see Smith’s (1994, 61) own formulation of internalism: 
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The Practicality Requirement: [Necessarily], if an agent judges 
that it is right for her to φ in circumstances C, then either she is 
motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational. 
 
Although externalists deny that there is that kind of an internal connection 
between moral judgments and motivation, they still need to explain why at 
least sometimes moral judgments tend to motivate us. As externalists claim 
that moral judgments at most motivate contingently, they would see to 
provide an explanation of why we generally tend to be motivated to act in 
accordance with our moral judgments from something else. At this point, 
Smith has assumed that the externalists would have to explain the 
connection between moral judgments and motivation by relying on a 
certain additional desire, namely the de dicto desire to do whatever is right 
(Smith 1994, 74; Smith 1997, 112).  
 
Yet, according to Smith (1994, 75; 1997, 113), the previous externalist 
explanation that relies on the de dicto desire to do whatever is right is 
counterintuitive. To see this, let us imagine that an agent judges that it is 
right to help her friends and family and also has a corresponding desire to 
help her friends and family. On the externalist account, the agent’s desire 
to help her friends and family in this case derives from her non-derivate 
desire—the de dicto desire to do whatever is right. This means that the 
agent desires to help her friends and family because she desires to do 
whatever is right, and helping her friends and family just happens to be the 
right thing. However, the externalist account of how an agent should be 
motivated does not seem to fit our ordinary understanding of good people’s 
psychology. We would normally expect that a morally good person cares 
non-derivatively about the well-being of her friends and family rather than 
the abstract property of moral rightness. Therefore, Smith (1994, 75) 
argues that if an agent were motivated by the de dicto desire to do whatever 
is right, she would have a moral fetish. 
 
 
2. Dreier’s Second-order Desire Model 
 
Externalists have tried to avoid Smith’s fetishism objection by attempting 
to explain the reliable connection between moral judgments and 
motivation in ways that do not rely on the de dicto desire to do whatever is 
right (Copp 1995,1997; Cuneo 1999; Dreier 2000; Lillehammer 1997). In 
order to pursue this externalist strategy successfully, externalists will need 
to explain the recognized reliable connection between moral judgments 
and motivation in a way that is both compatible with externalism and able 
to avoid the fetishism objection. In this section, I focus on James Dreier’s 
(2000) second-order desire model.  
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In order to explain what such a second-order desire is, Dreier begins from 
a maieutic end. A maieutic end is an end that is ‘achieved through the 
process of coming to have other ends’ (Schmitz 1994, 228; cf. Dreier 2000, 
630). Suppose that you want to have a rewarding career, and, because of 
this, you want to pursue a career in medicine. Pursuing a career in medicine 
necessarily requires adopting other ends, such as the goal of relieving the 
patients’ suffering and the goal of saving their lives. Effectively, the end 
of having a rewarding career in this case is also an end to have other ends 
in professional life, all of which make the career you end up choosing 
rewarding.  Here, the end of having a career in medicine is a maieutic end 
because it can only be pursued through having other ends.  
 
The previous discussion suggests that having a maieutic end requires 
having some other ends. In this way, a maieutic end resembles a second-
order desire the having of which also requires having first-order desires. 
Dreier thinks that we should be able to explain the reliable connection 
between moral judgments and motivation by assuming that a most ordinary 
agent has the second-order desire to desire to do what she judges to be 
right. This enables us to formulate the following view: 
 
The Second-order Desire Model: Take an agent who has a 
second-order desire to desire to do what she judges to be right. 
If that agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstances 
C, then her relevant second-order desire will produce a first-
order desire to φ in her, given that this desire is a desire she 
desires to have. 
 
In response to Smith’s objection, Dreier provides three reasons why he 
thinks that Smith is wrong (Dreier 2000, 636-637). Dreier first argues that 
nobody in the debate should complain about the relevant second-order 
desire itself because we should expect that an ordinary moral agent will 
have that desire. Imagine an agent who is not sure about what the right-
making features of an action are. Suppose that the agent is then asked: if 
someday you are able to figure out what the right-making features of the 
action are, would you hope to be motivated by those right-making features? 
As Dreier puts it, we would certainly expect the agent to say ‘yes’—to 
confirm that she would desire herself to be motivated by the right-making 
features of an action in the future. If the agent instead hoped that she would 
not be motivated by those right-making features in the future whatever they 
are, she would not seem to count as a good moral agent.  
 
Secondly, Dreier also considers whether the relevant second-order desire 
would play too much of a role in the previous account of moral motivation, 
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which he believes to be the most important concern behind the internalist 
objections. If that were the case, internalists could argue that the relevant 
second-order desire is merely another kind of the de dicto desire to do 
whatever is right. Yet, according to Dreier, the relevant second-order 
desire plays only a limited role in the account—a role that is not 
objectionable. Once the second-order desire in question produces the 
relevant first-order desire in the wake of a change in one’s moral 
judgments, the relevant second-order desire does not need to maintain the 
first-order desire after that. Consequently, the relevant second-order desire 
plays, according to Dreier, only a very limited causal role in explaining 
how an agent becomes motivated to act in accordance with her moral 
judgments. 
 
Dreier’s own illustration of this second point is the following (Dreier 2000, 
636-637). Let us imagine that David judges that it is right to stop using 
chimps in medical research. In this case, the relevant second-order desire 
in him would generate a first-order desire to stop doing so in the way 
described above. After this point, David’s first-order desire can play a 
motivating role by itself, and it can even produce other first-order desires. 
For example, that first-order desire to end using chimps in medical research 
can generate a new first-order desire to use other substitutes or a first-order 
desire to stop other researchers who continue to use chimps in their medical 
research. That said, all of David’s first-order desires in this case are de re 
desires that are not derivative of any other first-order desires and so they 
cannot be accused of being fetishistic. 
 
The third and last point Dreier makes can be seen as a further development 
of his second claim. Dreier claims that the resulting first-order desires are 
not conditional on rightness. To see why this would be the case, Dreier 
(2000, 637) invites us to compare the following two formulas that both try 
to describe David’s relevant first-order desire in the previous example: 
 
1. David desires that David does x 
2. David desires that David does x so long as x is right 
 
According to Drier, the first formula describes David’s first-order desire in 
the previous case correctly, whereas the second formula appears to 
misunderstand David’s first-order desires. Arguably, if David comes to 
have the first-order desire to end using chimps in medical research, this 
first-order desire will thereafter exist and function without being 
influenced by the judgment that it is wrong to use chimps in medical 
research. This view coheres with Dreier’s second point according to which 
the relevant second-order desire plays only a limited causal role in an 
agent’s process of acquiring motivation. 
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3. The Second-Order Desire Model Collapses into A Form of 
Internalism 
 
In the previous section, I examined whether the second-order desire model, 
as a version of externalism, is able to explain the reliable connection 
between moral judgments and motivation in a non-fetishistic way. At least 
for the purpose of this paper and on the basis of Dreier’s responses, I am 
willing to grant that perhaps it can. Rather, what I want to challenge next 
is whether this account is compatible with externalism itself. In the rest of 
this section, I will, however, try to argue that the relevant second-order 
desire required by Dreier’s model is a constitutive requirement of 
rationality itself. This means that the fundamental problem of the second-
order desire model is that it collapses into a form of internalism and so the 
response cannot be available to externalists.  
 
Let us then begin from of what practical rationality is generally thought to 
consists.1 According to Michael Smith himself, in order to be fully rational, 
an agent has to meet four requirements: she should have no false beliefs, 
she should have all the relevant true beliefs, she should have a 
systematically justifiable set of desires and she should not suffer from any 
physical or psychological disturbances (Smith 1994, 156-161; 1995, 112-
116; 1996a, 160; 2002, 311-315). 
 
To see why the relevant second-order desire to have the first-order desires 
that match one’s moral judgments would be required by the previous 
 
1 Here, it is worthwhile to consider an objection to Smith’s concept of practical rationality, 
which was first stated by Alex Miller (2003, 221), and echoed by Roskies (2003, 53) and 
Strandberg (2013, 29-31). On Miller’s view, Smith tends to think that, when the additional 
condition—being practically rational—has not been met, something blocks the normal way 
in which moral judgments give rise to motivation. This entails that, when the relevant 
condition has been met, the cases in which moral judgments fail to motivate cannot exist. 
This entailment thereby leads to the concern that Smith formulates his view merely by 
precluding all the situations where the counterexamples could be put forward. All that is 
left of internalism is thus the claim that internalism is true except when internalism is not 
true. Actually, it seems that the condition in which there is no connection between moral 
judgments and motivation has been given an insubstantial characterization. Because of this, 
the resulting forms of conditional internalism become trivial.  
Yet, Smith’s conditional internalism will not be trivially true simply because it formulates 
the condition which it then uses to deal with counterexamples. In this section, I will discuss 
that in order to count as fully rational, an agent has to satisfy four requirements. This 
description of the requirements for being fully rational provides an informative, substantial 
characterization of the condition. In Section 4.2, I will provide an independent, substantial 
explanation of the condition in which moral judgments must lead to motivation. Since moral 
agents in the counterexamples fail to satisfy the proposed internalist condition, it is 
understandable that they remain unmotivated by their relevant moral judgments.  
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constitutive requirements of rationality, we need to focus on the third 
requirement of rationality—that of having a systematically justifiable set 
of desires. By this third requirement, Smith means that a rational agent 
must have coherent and unified sets of desires. This is to say that a rational 
agent’s desires do not first of all tend to conflict with each other—they do 
not pull the agent towards different directions at the same time. 
Additionally, the desires in the set support each other: they are in harmony 
with each other.  
 
We can then consider in more detail how we should understand what it is 
for a set of desires to be coherent and unified. For example, if I feel cold, I 
may come to have a desire to turn up the heating and to put on more clothes. 
I might also come to have a desire not to open the window as doing so 
would bring even more cold air into the room. I might even have a higher-
order desire to desire to take measures to keep the room warm. In addition, 
if there are other people in the room, I might continue to desire that those 
people also both desire and do as I do. My desires in this case are what 
Smith calls a systematically justifiable set of desires. It is evident that my 
desires aim at the same direction and they support one another rather than 
contradict with each other. Because of this, having such a set of coherent 
and unified desires should be thought of as rational—the desires in the set 
will finally lead to achieving what you most care about.  
 
Of course, sometimes there will unavoidably be situations in which you 
will have different first-order desires that are not very coherent or unified, 
and sometimes those desires may even contradict each other. For example, 
you may have a set of desires concerning which methods of transport you 
would like to use for travelling. This set can include a desire to take a bus 
to work, a train when travelling to other cities nearby, and a desire to fly 
when you go abroad. At least initially, could the previous set of desires be 
made more coherent and unified?  
 
At this point, Smith argues that a fully rational agent’s disposition towards 
coherence and unity will under some circumstances change her desires 
(Smith 1994, 159-161; 1997, 94). The rational disposition towards 
coherence and unity can, for example, produce general desires that will 
support the more specific desires and also these new general desires will 
in some cases destroy some of the previous first-order desires that do not 
fit them. Smith would then ask you to consider whether the previous 
specific desires would be more systematically justifiable if a more general 
desire which could justify and explain those specific desires were added to 
your psychological make-up. For example, you could add a general 
desire—a desire to choose the most affordable and convenient means to go 
where you want to go—to your set of desires. This general desire could 
EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 1 | 2021                     Discussion 2  
 12 
justify the previous set of desires by explaining why you would not want 
to travel to a faraway country by bus given that it is obvious that traveling 
by plane to another country is often more convenient and more economical. 
With the new added general desire, the relevant set of desires will be more 
systematically justifiable and thus more unified and also rationally 
preferable. 
 
Analogously, we can argue that the second-order desire to desire to do what 
you judge to be right would be required by rationality, exactly in the same 
way as the general desire to travel in the most economical and convenient 
way is required in the case above. Consider, for example, an agent who has 
various moral desires, desires to treat her friends well, to keep her 
promises, to not cause physical harm to anyone and so on. These first-order 
desires are all distinct from one another because they are all related to 
different kinds of behaviour. However, a second-order desire to desire to 
do what one judges to be right would in this case justify and explain why 
the agent has the previous desires to do all the different things that she 
judges to be right. It could then be argued that the desiderative set also 
becomes more rationally preferable as a consequence of having that 
second-order desire.2 
 
If, as I have just argued, the relevant second-order desire discussed by 
Dreier is required by the fundamental constitutive requirements of 
rationality—coherence and unity, having a second-order desire to do what 
one judges to be right (that will produce a first-order desire) is a matter of 
fulfilling a constitutive requirement of rationality. This means that a 
rational agent, who satisfies the constitutive requirements of rationality, 
would have the second-order desire to desire to do what she judges to be 
right. Assuming that the agent must also have the desires that she desires 
to have (given her constitutive disposition towards coherence), Dreier’s 
second-order desire model thus entails that a rational agent will necessarily 
have at least some motivation to act in accordance with her moral 
judgments. If the agent did not, she would be less coherent and less rational 
as well.  
 
 
2 Someone might worry that the argument in this section does not show that rationality 
requires an agent to have the relevant second-order desire. Rather, the argument only shows 
that rationality requires an agent to have the relevant second-order desire if she has already 
had various moral desires. This worry seems to treat various moral desires as a premise of 
my argument. But that is not the reason why I employ various moral desires in my example. 
Those various moral desires are employed merely to show that the relevant second-order 
desire can make an agent’s various moral desires more rationally preferable when she 
conducts moral deliberation. It would be too demanding to assume that an agent cannot 
have different moral desires when conducting moral deliberation. 
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This consequence furthermore means that Dreier’s second-order desire 
model actually entails a form of conditional internalism the acceptance of 
which creates a commitment to a necessary connection between moral 
judgments and motivation. As a result, it seems that what Dreier proposes 
on the basis of the relevant second-order desires cannot be an entirely new 
externalist solution to the problem of moral motivation. Rather, the second-
order desire model has actually collapsed into a form of internalism.   
 
 
4. Responses to Objections 
 
I have argued that the second-order desire model collapses into a form of 
conditional internalism. Before concluding, I shall consider two objections 
which the externalists might put forward to my argument. The first 
objection claims that the second-order desire model does not collapse into 
a form of internalism. The second objection further claims that, even if the 
second-order desire model collapses into another proposal, that proposal 
cannot be a form of internalism. In response, in the rest of this section, I 
will argue that both potential objections are implausible. 
 
4.1 A Response to Sayre-McCord’s Objection   
 
The externalists may refuse to accept my argument that the second-order 
desire model collapses into a form of internalism. They could, for example, 
challenge the claim that a more general back-ground desire can make a 
given set of desires more coherent, unified and therefore also more rational 
(Sayre-McCord 1997, 75). If, arguably, a more general desire cannot make 
a given set of desires more coherent and unified, then an agent who comes 
to have such desires cannot be thought of as more rational. Furthermore, it 
could also be claimed that the relevant second-order desire of Dreier’s 
model cannot contribute to making an ordinary moral agent more rational 
either. If this were right, we would have no reason to believe that the 
second-order desire model collapses into a form of internalism as I have 
suggested. 
 
To illustrate this concern, we can consider Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s case 
of choosing an ice cream (Sayre-McCord 1997, 75). If we suppose that 
Smith’s view is true, then, if I have a desire for coffee ice cream, my set of 
desires could be argued to exhibit more coherence and unity if a more 
general unconditional desire for ice cream were added to my current 
desiderative profile. My set of desires could be claimed to be more 
coherent and unified because the newly added general desire would be able 
to explain why I desire to enjoy coffee ice cream.  
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In this situation, eating coffee ice cream will satisfy both my desire for 
coffee ice cream and my general unconditional desire for ice cream. Sayre-
McCord then objects that it is not plausible to think that satisfying the 
previous two desires would make me any more rational than how rational 
I am with merely my original desire (Sayre-McCord 1997, 76). So, he 
thinks that adding more desires, including more general desires, to a 
desiderative profile cannot itself enhance an agent’s rationality as Smith 
suggests.  
 
It seems that the crucial dispute between Sayre-McCord and Smith is over 
whether adding a more general desire to an agent’s desiderative profile can 
make the agent more rational. I think that Sayre-McCord is right in 
claiming that merely satisfying more desires cannot itself make an agent 
more rational. Yet, the number of satisfied desires is not what Smith’s view 
of rationality is based on. The key point of his view is that sometimes 
adding a more general desire to an existing set of desires can make the set 
more coherent and unified. This is the real reason why Smith would think 
that adding a more general desire can in the previous case make my desire 
set more rationally preferable. 
 
In the previous case, it is supposed that I initially have a desire to have 
coffee ice cream. Usually, my desire to have coffee ice cream will move 
me to get it when it is available. Despite this, if I only had this one desire, 
I would presumably often ask myself: why do I choose to have coffee ice 
cream rather than other flavours or even other kinds of dessert (Smith 1997, 
94)? The desire to have coffee ice cream itself does not seem to be able to 
answer this question. Yet, if a general, unconditional desire to eat what I 
enjoy eating, for example, were added to my desire set, this more general 
desire would be able to explain my specific desire to have coffee ice cream. 
The desire to eat coffee ice cream would no longer appear to be arbitrary, 
but rather it would be well-supported by the more general desire. In this 
way, my desire set has turned out to be more coherent, unified and thus 
more rationally preferable. 
 
4.2 A Response to Bromwich’s Objection 
 
The externalists may continue to reject my argument by presenting 
Bromwich’s (2010, 344; 2011, 75) challenge which claims that Smith’s 
conditional internalism fails to capture the necessary connection between 
moral judgments and motivation. According to Bromwich, once practical 
rationality is inserted between moral judgments and motivation, it becomes 
unclear whether the motivation is still internal or built in to those moral 
judgments. Factors external to moral judgments—such as practical 
rationality—are now necessary for moral judgments to cause motivation. 
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Arguably, it is not an agent’s moral judgments that produce motivation, 
but rather it is an agent’s disposition towards coherence required by 
practical rationality that produces motivation to act accordingly 
(Bromwich 2011, 75; Svavarsdóttir 1999, 165). As a result, the necessary 
connection that is supposed to exist between moral judgments and 
motivation actually exists between an agent’s disposition towards 
coherence and her motivation. If Bromwich’s objection were right, then 
Smith’s conditional internalism would not be regarded as an internalist 
view, and this furthermore means that even if the second-order desire 
model does collapse, it does not collapse into a form of internalism.  
 
In order to see why Bromwich’s challenge is implausible to accept, let us 
first consider why Smith thinks that moral judgments produce motivation 
essentially. Smith begins by analysing the concepts employed in moral 
judgments (in a similar way as we could try to analyse other concepts). 
Take the concept of ‘a bachelor’ for illustration. When I think that Mark is 
a bachelor, what I am thinking of is that Mark is a male and unmarried. 
This is because the concept of bachelorhood can be reductively analysed 
in terms of being male and unmarriedness. Similarly, Smith claims that 
moral concepts can be reductively understood to be about reasons for 
actions (Smith 1994, 62). When an action is judged to be right or wrong, a 
part of this thought is always that there are at least some reasons either to 
perform or refrain from doing the action.  
 
The content of an agent’s moral judgments, that is, the content of the 
thought that there are reasons for actions can be investigated further. 
Smith’s (1994, 151-152) proposal is that, when an agent believes that there 
are reasons for her to carry out a certain action, she essentially believes that 
her fully rational version would want her to do that action in the actual 
situation she is in. So, for example, an agent’s judgment that it is right to 
help innocent people is a judgment about what she has reasons to do. And, 
the content of this judgment, according to Smith, is that her fully rational 
version would want the agent to help the innocent in the situation she is in.  
 
At this point, based on the content of her moral judgments, the agent has 
two options: either she will desire to help those innocent people to get rid 
of the plight or she will lack that desire. As I have discussed in Section 3, 
because practical rationality can be thought to consist at least in part of a 
disposition to have coherent mental states, a practically rational agent is 
disposed towards coherence. It is then plausible to suggest that a desire to 
help innocent people coheres better with the belief according to which the 
agent’s fully rational version would want her to help the innocent. This 
means that, when an agent is practically rational, she will desire to act in 
accordance with her moral judgments, or so Smith argues. 
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The above discussion shows that an agent’s disposition towards coherence 
plays an important role in Smith’s explanation of how moral judgments 
produce motivation. But it would be implausible to thus claim that there 
actually exists a necessary connection between an agent’s disposition 
towards coherence and her motivation as Bromwich does. Bromwich’s 
challenge claims that it is an agent’s disposition towards coherence that 
produces motivation. In contrast, Smith’s own explanation suggests that it 
is an agent’s moral judgment that produces corresponding motivation. On 
Smith’s view, an agent’s disposition towards coherence does not cause 
motivation, but rather it causes her motivation to cohere with the content 
of her moral judgment. The problem with Bromwich’s challenge is that it 
mistakes the causal role that a moral judgment plays for the causal role that 
an agent’s disposition towards coherence plays within Smith’s conditional 
internalism. Given that Bromwich’s challenge is based on a 
misunderstanding of Smith’s view, we should still believe that there exists 
a reliable connection between moral judgments and motivation within 





In this paper, I have argued that Dreier’s second-order desire model 
collapsed into a form of internalism and thus cannot be available as an 
externalist option. We normally assume that a rational agent who has made 
a genuine moral judgment about what the right thing to do is has at least 
some motivation to perform that action, otherwise, she would be thought 
of as less coherent. I explained how rationality can be used to account for 
previous intuitions. It turns out that rationality itself requires that a rational 
agent has a second-order desire to desire what she judges to be right so that 
this desire makes the agent’s set of desires more unified and coherent. 
Furthermore, because a rational agent who has the relevant second-order 
desire is disposed towards coherence, she will have some motivation to act 
in accordance with her moral judgments. As a consequence, Dreier’s 
second-order desire model collapses into a form of internalism that is 
conditional on rationality. This also means that Dreier’s second-order 
desire model cannot be used as an externalist alternative to explain the 
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